# Privacy Enhancing Technologies Background Sheet

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# **1 Complexity**

## **1.1 Asymptotic Notation**

#### **1.1.1 Big O Notation**

Big O notation is used to describe the upper bound of the growth rate of a function.

**Definition 1.** For functions  $f, g : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R}^+$ , we say  $f(n) = O(g(n))$  if  $\exists c > 0, n_0 \in \mathbb{N}$ such that  $\forall n \geq n_0$ :  $f(n) \leq c \cdot g(n)$ 

#### **1.1.2 Little o Notation**

Little o notation provides a strict upper bound, stronger than Big O.

**Definition 2.** For functions  $f, g : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R}^+$ , we say  $f(n) = o(g(n))$  if  $\forall c > 0, \exists n_0 \in \mathbb{N}$ such that  $\forall n > n_0$ :

$$
f(n) < c \cdot g(n)
$$

#### **1.1.3 Omega Notation**

Omega notation describes the lower bound of the growth rate of a function.

**Definition 3.** For functions  $f, g : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R}^+$ , we say  $f(n) = \Omega(g(n))$  if  $\exists c > 0, n_0 \in \mathbb{N}$ such that  $\forall n \geq n_0$ :

$$
f(n) \geq c \cdot g(n)
$$

## **1.2 P vs NP**

#### **1.2.1 Definitions**

Let Σ be a finite alphabet and *L* ⊆ Σ <sup>∗</sup> be a language.

**Definition 4** (P)**.** P is the class of languages decidable in polynomial time by a deterministic Turing machine. Formally:

$$
P = \bigcup_{k \in \mathbb{N}} TIME(n^k)
$$

where  $TIME(t(n))$  is the class of languages decidable by a deterministic Turing machine in  $O(t(n))$  time.

**Definition 5** (NP)**.** NP is the class of languages verifiable in polynomial time by a deterministic Turing machine. Formally,  $L \in NP$  if ∃ polynomial *p* and polynomial-time decidable relation  $R \subseteq \Sigma^* \times \Sigma^*$  such that:

 $x \in L \iff \exists y \in \Sigma^*$ ,  $|y| \leq p(|x|) : R(x, y)$ 

Here, *y* is called a witness or certificate.

#### **1.2.2 Relationship**

It is clear that  $P \subseteq NP$ , as any language decidable in polynomial time is also verifiable in polynomial time. The central question in complexity theory is whether P = NP or P  $\neq$ NP.

# **2 Basic Cryptographic Primitives**

We say a function  $f(n)$  is negligible if  $f(n) = o(n^{-c})$  for all constants  $c \in \mathbb{N}$ .

#### **2.1 Pseudorandom Number Generator (PRNG)**

A function  $G: \{0,1\}^s \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$  where  $n > s$  is a secure PRNG if for any probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher *D*:

$$
|\Pr[D(G(\mathcal{U}_s)) = 1] - \Pr[D(\mathcal{U}_n) = 1]| \leq negl(s)
$$

where  $\mathcal{U}_k$  denotes the uniform distribution over  $\{0,1\}^k.$ 

#### **2.2 Pseudorandom Generator (PRG)**

A PRG takes a short random seed  $s \in \{0,1\}^\lambda$  and expands it into a long "random looking' string  $G(s) \in \{0,1\}^{\ell}$  where  $\ell > \lambda$ .

A PRG  $G:\{0,1\}^\lambda \to \{0,1\}^\ell$  where  $\ell > \lambda$  is a deterministic poly-time algorithm. It is secure if for all poly-time algorithms  $A$ :

$$
|\Pr[s \leftarrow \$ \{0,1\}^\lambda : \mathcal{A}(G(s)) = 1] - |\Pr[t \leftarrow \$ \{0,1\}^\ell : \mathcal{A}(t) = 1]| \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)
$$

## **2.3 Cryptographic Hash Function**

A Cryptographic Hash Function is a function  $H: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$  with the following properties:

- Collision resistance: It's computationally infeasible to find  $x \neq y$  such that  $H(x) =$ *H*(*y*).
- Preimage resistance: Given *y*, it's computationally infeasible to find *x* such that  $H(x) =$ *y*.

## **2.4 Symmetric Encryption with Semantic Security**

For a symmetric encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec), semantic security means that an adversary cannot distinguish between encryptions of two different messages (this is also called *indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks*, or IND-CPA).

We can formalize this as follows. For every probabilistic polynomial time algorithm  $A$  and two arbitrary messages  $m_0$ ,  $m_1$ , we have:

$$
Pr[\mathcal{A}(\text{Enc}_k(m_b)) = b : k \leftarrow \text{Gen}()] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(n)(n)
$$

# **3 Number Theory**

#### **3.1 Groups**

A group  $(G, \cdot)$  is a set G with a binary operation " $\cdot$ " satisfying:

- Closure: ∀*a*, *b* ∈ **G**, *a* · *b* ∈ **G**
- Associativity:  $\forall a, b, c \in \mathbb{G}$ ,  $(a \cdot b) \cdot c = a \cdot (b \cdot c)$
- Identity:  $\exists e \in \mathbb{G}$  such that  $\forall a \in \mathbb{G}$ ,  $e \cdot a = a \cdot e = a$
- Inverse:  $\forall a \in \mathbb{G}$ ,  $\exists a^{-1} \in \mathbb{G}$  such that  $a \cdot a^{-1} = a^{-1} \cdot a = e$

## **3.2 Generator and Order**

For a finite group  $\mathbb{G}$ , an element  $g \in \mathbb{G}$  is a generator if  $\{g^k : k \in \mathbb{Z}\} = \mathbb{G}$ . The order of  $\mathbb{G}$  is |**G**|, the number of elements in **G**.

## **3.3 Hardness Assumptions in Groups**

The following problems are believed to be hard in some groups that are widely used in cryptography. In each case, let *g* be a randomly chosen generator of a group **G** of order *q*.

**Discrete Logarithm:** Given an element  $h \in G$ , it is hard to find  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$  such that  $g^x = g$ *h*.

**Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH):** Given  $g^a$ ,  $g^b \in G$  for random  $a$ ,  $b \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ , it is hard to compute *g ab*

**Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH):** It is hard to distinguish between the distributions  $(g^a, g^b, g^{ab})$  and  $(g^a, g^b, g^c)$  for random *a*, *b*, *c*  $\in \mathbb{Z}_q$ .

# **3.4 Finite Fields**

A finite field is a finite set  $\mathbb F$  with two operations " $+$ " and " $\cdot$ ", such that:

- Addition and multiplication are both associative and commutative.
- There exists an additive identity 0 and multiplicative identity 1.
- Every element has an additive inverse.
- Every non-zero element has a multiplicative inverse.
- Multiplication distributes over addition.

The integers  $\mathbb{Z}_p$  modulo a prime  $p$  form a finite field.

# **4 Probability and Statistics**

## **4.1 Expectation and Variance**

For a discrete random variable *X*:

- Expectation:  $\mathbb{E}[X] = \sum_{x} x \cdot \Pr[X = x]$
- Variance:  $Var[X] = E[(X E[X])^2] = E[X^2] (E[X])^2$

# **4.2 Probability Inequalities**

- Union Bound:  $Pr[\bigcup_i A_i] \leq \sum_i Pr[A_i]$
- Markov's Inequality: For non-negative *X* and  $a > 0$ ,  $Pr[X \ge a] \le \frac{E[X]}{a}$ *a*
- Chebyshev's Inequality: For any random variable *X* with mean  $\mu$  and variance  $\sigma^2$ , and  $k > 0$ ,  $Pr[|X - \mu| \geq k\sigma] \leq \frac{1}{k^2}$
- Chernoff / Hoeffding Bound: Let *X*1, . . . , *X<sup>n</sup>* be independent random variables taking values in [a, b]. Let  $X = \sum_i X_i$  and  $\mu = \mathbb{E}[X]$ . Then:

$$
Pr[|X - \mu| \ge t] \le 2 \exp\left(-\frac{2t^2}{n(b-a)^2}\right)
$$

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# **4.3 Standard Probability Distributions**

- Bernoulli:  $\text{Ber}(p)$ :  $\text{Pr}[X = 1] = p$ ,  $\text{Pr}[X = 0] = 1 p$ ,  $\mathbb{E}[X] = p$ ,  $\text{Var}[X] = p(1 p)$
- Binomial:  $\text{Bin}(n, p)$ :  $\Pr[X = k] = \binom{n}{k}$  $h_k^n$ ) $p^k(1-p)^{n-k}$ ,  $\mathbb{E}[X] = np$ ,  $\text{Var}[X] = np(1-p)$
- Gaussian  $\mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2)$ :  $f(x) = \frac{1}{\sigma \sqrt{x}}$ √  $\frac{1}{2\pi}e^{-\frac{(x-\mu)^2}{2\sigma^2}}$  $\overline{2\sigma^2}$ ,  $\mathbb{E}[X] = \mu$ ,  $\text{Var}[X] = \sigma^2$